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TAFT-HARTLEY REGULATION OF EMPLOYER PAYMENTS
TO UNION REPRESENTATIVES: BRIBERY, EXTORTION
AND WELFARE FUNDS UNDER SECTION 302
ENACTED as a "stopgap" measure in 1947 and never revised, section 302
of the Taft-Hartley Act was primarily designed to regulate employer pay-
ments to union welfare funds.' The United Mine Workers had demanded
employer contributions to a union-administered welfare trust which did not
lodge specific enforceable rights in the member beneficiaries.2 Fearing that
1. 61. STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1952). "I think a complete study of the
question ought to be made and that in the end there ought to be some governmental
regulation of the character of the fund. This is, in a way, a stopgap provision until
a further study can be made, in order that abuses may not arise." Remarks of Senator
Taft, 93 CONG. REc. 4747 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIoNs ACT, 1947, 1313 (1948) (hereinafter cited as LEGIsLA-
TIVE HISTORY).
Section 302 was based upon an amendment to the Case Bill, H.R. 4908, 79th Cong.,
2d 'Sess. § 8 (1946), offered by Senator Byrd, 92 CONG. R'c. 4809 (1946). The bill, as
amended, failed to pass after presidential veto. Id. at 6678.
The principal purpose of the Byrd amendment was "to prohibit the labor unions from
requiring welfare funds to be paid into the treasuries of the labor unions." Remarks of
Senator Byrd, 93 CONG. REc. 4678 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY 1305.
As passed by the House, the Hartley bill made all employer payments to a welfare
fund over which a labor organization exercised any control an unfair labor practice.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (2) (C) (ii) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 178. The senate bill contained a section essentially identical to the present § 302.
H.R. 3020, as passed by Senate, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY 226. The senate version was adopted, without substantial change, by the
Conference Committee. H.R. RaP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947), reprinted in
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 571. For an analysis of congressional purpose, see notes 3-4
infra and accompanying text.
2. A prolonged strike induced by a bitter dispute between the United Mine Workers
and mine owners over safety, working conditions, wages and welfare benefits resulted in
federal seizure of the mines, an injunction against the striking mine workers and the
conviction of John L. Lewis and the UMW for civil and criminal contempt of court.
United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). For a documentary chronology of the
dispute, see WEicn, THE MINERS' CASE AND PuBac INTEREST (1947). See also Hear-
ings Before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
4, at 1984-2020 (1947) (Lewis's reasons for demanding welfare benefits).
Lewis demanded that 7% of gross payroll be paid to a fund administered by the union
to provide medical care, life insurance, vocational training for the disabled, financial as-
sistance to the families of injured miners and, if any funds were left over, educational and
cultural facilities for the miners. Statement of John L. Lewis, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1946,
p. 1, col. 5, reprinted in WEIcE, op. cit. supra at 53. Lewis argued that no other agency
could operate the fund as efficiently or cheaply as the UMW.
After seizing the mines, under the authority of the War Labor Disputes Act, 1943,
c. 144, § 3, 57 STAT. 164, the government granted a welfare and retirement fund, to be
supported by a five cent per ton royalty on coal and administered by three trustees, one
appointed by each of the parties and the third chosen by the appointees. The money was
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the money might not be dispensed impartially nor used exclusively for health
and welfare purposes, Congress felt an immediate need for regulatory legis-
lation.3 At the same time, it desired to counter the general failure of state
law to prevent extortion of employers and bribery of union officials. 4 To these
to be used for making payments to miners and their dependents for (1) wage loss due
to sickness, disability, death or retirement, and (2) "other related welfare purposes, as
determined by the trustees." Bituminous Coal Agreement, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1946,
p. 2, col. 3, reprinted in WELcH, op. cit. supra at 43. The three trustees were subse-
quently unable to agree upon the "other related welfare purposes." Van Horn v. Lewis,
79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948). For a history of the miners' health and welfare fund
and an analysis of its effectiveness, see S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 107-11
(1956) (hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT). For an opinion that § 302 does -not cover
the fund, see Schmidt, United Mine Workers' Welfare and Retirenent Funds, 16 FoRD-
HAm L. REv. 253 (1947).
3. Congress was concerned that mine workers would be unable to enforce their bene-
ficial interest in union-administered welfare funds. S. REP. No. 105, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
52 (1947) (supplemental views of Senators Taft, Ball, Donnell, Jenner and Smith), re-
printed in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 458; 93 CONG. REC. 4678-80, 4746-53 (1947) (senate
debate), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1304-23. "If it is only a trust fund for wel-
fare purposes, with no specific terms or regulations, a court of chancery cannot write a
welfare fund system into it. The court has no power to do that. No single employee can
bring suit under such a general fund provision and prove that he personally has any
rights whatever in the fund." Remarks of Senator Taft, id. at 4753, 2 LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY at 1322.
Furthermore, Congress feared that, without legislative restrictions, union officers might
"distribute it to members of the union whom they like . . . and they may refuse to dis-
tribute it to other members whom they do not like." Remarks of Senator Taft, id. at
4746, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 1311. Senator Taft analogized the mine workers' five
cent per ton royalty to a private tax improperly invading a sphere of governmental
activity. Id. at 4747, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 1312-13. And several Senators feared
that wages would be diverted to union control for vague welfare purposes against the
employees' will. Remarks of Senator Taft, id. at 4746, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 1311-
12; Senator Ball, id. at 4678, 2 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY at 1305. Without restrictions
upon permissible purposes, one Senator envisaged the use of "diverted wages" for -non-
welfare purposes. "[Tihere is very grave danger that the funds will be used for the
personal gain of union leaders, or for political purposes . . . ." Remarks of Senator Ball,
ibid. Senator Taft thought that the funds, if unrestricted, might become "merely a war
chest for the particular union, and that the employees for whose benefit it is supposed to
be established, for certain definite welfare purposes, will have no legal rights and will not
receive the kind of benefits to which they are entitled after such deductions from their
wages." Id. at 4747, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 1312. He pointed out that, under the
originally proposed agreement, John L. Lewis could "distribute the fund for the benefit
of schools, or he could operate anything he wished to operate in the nature of local gov-
ernment." Ibid.
4. See MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw § 162 (1934). "The amendment [§ 302] makes ex-
tortion illegal . . . ." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947) (supplemental
views of Senators Taft, Ball, Donnell, Jenner and Smith), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 458. Senator Taft also stated that § 302 was to prevent the union representative,
"the man who is bargaining," from "shaking down" the employer to obtain "any personal
advantage." 93 CONG. REc. 4746 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1311. How-
ever, state extortion laws, if unrestricted to action under color of office, are applicable to
union officials. See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAw § 850; People v. Weinseimer, 1.17 App. Div.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ends, section 302 was adopted pending a comprehensive investigation of wel-
603, 102 N.Y. Supp. 579 (1st Dep't), aff'd per curiain, 190 N.Y. 537, 83 N.E. 1129 (1907);
Cf. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 324-27 (1957).
At common law, only "a judge, or other person concerned with the administration
of justice" could be bribed. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139. But bribery has been
generally extended by statute and judicial interpretation to cover the giving and the
taking of value to influence the official action of any public officer or citizen performing
an official act. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW § 161 (1934); PERKINS, CRmIINAL LAW 396-408
(1957).
Only five states have made bribery of union officials a crime. NEv. REv. STAT. §§
614.140, 614.150 (1956) (payment to, or receipt by, a duly appointed labor representative
intended to influence his acts a gross misdemeanor) ; N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A :93-7 (Supp.
1957) (same, misdemeanor) ; N.Y. PEN. LAW § 380 (payment to, or receipt by, any rep-
resentative of a labor organization or any welfare fund trustee with intent to influence
any of his actions, decisions or duties a misdemeanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-37-3
(Supp. 1957) (any person acting in connection with employment who takes any compen-
sation for or on account of the employment or continued employment of any laborer
guilty of a misdemeanor) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 49.44.020 (Supp. 1957) (payment to, or
receipt by, a duly constituted representative of a labor organization intended to influence
his acts or duties a gross misdemeanor).
Remarkably few cases have arisen under these statutes. See People v. Chester, 4 Misc.
2d 949, 158 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1956) (sustaining indictment
charging solicitation of employer payments to reorganize payor's employees into a more
"co-operative" union). In People v. Cilento, 1 App. Div. 2d 206, 149 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st
Dep't 1956), the New York bribery statute was construed not to prohibit bribery of a
labor relresentative acting in the capacity of welfare fund trustee. The statute was sub-
sequently amended to include such trustees. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 380. A number of periph-
eral issues have arisen under the New York labor bribery statute. See Matter of Knapp
v. Schweitzer, 2 N.Y.2d 913, 914 (1957) (affirming conviction for contempt of defendant
who refused to answer questions incriminatory under New York bribery statute on ground
that immunity from prosecution granted him illusory since § 302 pre-empted the state law
and state could not grant immunity from federal prosecution) ; Hornstein v. Paramount
Pictures, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740 (1944) (shareholder's derivative suit to compel
restitution of funds paid to labor extortionist without merit since funds were paid under
threat of violence and not "given" with intent to influence).
Antibribery statutes in many states which prohibit payments to agents or employees
of a principal might encompass bribery of a union leader. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAws
c. 271, § 39 (Supp. 1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-336 (Supp. 1956). See also Note, 58
CoLum. L. REv. 78, 91-92 (1958). But the statutes have not been so used.
Pre-§ 302 federal legislation proscribed some employer payments to union officials.
The Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1952), prohibits the obstruction
of interstate commerce by extortion through threat of violence or fear. Although "fear"
has been construed to include fear of loss of property or economic injury, § 302 has been
held not to constitute a lesser included offense in an indictment under the Hobbs Act,
for the statutes cover "different ground." Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 190,
193 (8th Cir. 1955). For a collection of the cases arising under the Hobbs Act, see Note,
67 YALE L.J. 325, 328-29 & n.18 (1957). Employer payments to a union official conceiv-
ably may amount to a conspiracy to commit "an offense against the United States," 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1952), since "offense" has been construed as embracing acts for which a
civil penalty may be imposed as well as crimes, United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524
(1921). Whether conspiring to interfere with rights granted under the Wagner Act is
an "offense against the United States" has never been decided.
Under the Wagner Act, employer payments to a representative of his employees con-
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fare funds.5 Bribery and extortion were condemned through a blanket pro-
stitute an unfair labor practice if such payments contribute financial support to a labor
organization, interfere with or dominate its formation and administration or coerce or
interfere with an employee's right to self-organization and collective bargaining. 49
STAT. 452 (1935), carried forward as Taft-Hartley §§ 8(a) (1), (2), 61 STAT. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (2) (1952) ; see notes 18-19 infra and accompanying
text.
5. See note 1 supra. Relevantly, the statute reads:
"SEc. 302. (a) It shall be unlawful for. any employer to pay or deliver, or to agree
to pay or deliver, any money or other thing of value to any representative of any of his
employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce.
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any representative of any employees who are employed
in an industry affecting commerce to receive or accept, or to agree to receive or accept,
from the employer of such employees any money or other thing of value.
"(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable (1) with respect to any
money or other thing of value payable by an employer to any representative who is an
employee or former employee of such employer, as compensation for, or by reason of, his
services as an employee of such employer; (2) with respect to the payment or delivery
of any money or other thing of value in satisfaction of a judgment of any court or a
decision or award of an arbitrator or impartial chairman or in compromise, adjustment,
settlement or release of any claim, complaint, grievance, or dispute in the absence of
fraud or duress; (3) with respect to the sale or purchase of an article or commodity at
the prevailing market price in the regular course of business; (4) with respect to money
deducted from the wages of employees in payment of membership dues in a labor organi-
zation: Provided, That the employer has received from each employee, on whose account
such deductions are made, a written assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a
period of more than one year, or beyond the termination date of the applicable collective
agreement, whichever occurs sooner; or (5) with respect to money or other thing of value
paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit
of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or of such em-
ployees, families, and dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making
similar payments, and their families and dependents) : Provided, That (A) such pay-
ments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or
both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital
care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness
resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or un-
employment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident in-
surance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a
written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally repre-
sented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the rep-
resentatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree upon
and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of
such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agree-
ment provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such
dispute, or in event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an im-
partial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by
the district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its prin-
cipal office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a state-
ment of the results of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons at the
principal office of the trust fund and at such other places as may be designated in such
written agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose
of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which pro-
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scription of employer payments to a "representative of his employees." And
welfare funds were subjected to a detailed regulatory scheme embodied in
one of a number of exceptions which required that payments be held in trust
for the exclusive benefit of employees and that the fund be administered
jointly by labor and management.1 In operation, section 302 has neither
vides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such
pensions or annuities.
"(d) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this section shall,
upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and be subject to a fine of not more
than $10,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both."
61 STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1952).
6. See statute quoted note 5 supra. Section 302 is a "criminal provision, inalum
prohibitum, which outlaws all payments, with stated exceptions, between employer and
representative." United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 305 (1956). To obtain a conviction
under § 302, only a willfully made and received payment need be proved. Evil intent or
mens rea is not an element of the offense. Brennan v. United States, 240 F.2d 253, 265
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957).
:Strict liability in the criminal law has generally been limited to public-welfare of-
fenses, such as sale of impure foods, violation of traffic or general safety laws and sexual
offenses, such as statutory rape, bigamy and adultery. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses,
33 COLUm. L. REV. 55, 72-75 (1933). Imprisonment for offenses not requiring proof of
snens rea has been severely criticized. Id. at 79-80. PERKINS, CRI1IINAL LAw 701-10
(1957). But it has been considered appropriate where the offender owes some higher stand-
ard of conduct than an ordinary citizen. Thus, many states penalize bank officers or
trustees for loss of funds committed to their care without requiring proof of intent to
injure the beneficial owner. Id. at 247. And a labor official may have an analogous fidu-
ciary responsibility to those he represents. See, e.g., Dusing v. Nuzzo, 26 N.Y.S.2d 345,
349-50 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
On the other hand, § 302 proscribes such innocent payments to a representative as
Christmas presents. While gratuities of this kind are not to be encodraged, they should
not evoke the same sanctions as bribery. Although including inens rea as an element of
a § 302 offense would prevent the conviction of innocent offenders, it might unduly
burden prosecution in cases where the payment ought to be proscribed. A possible com-
promise would prohibit only those payments made, or received, with intent to influence
the official actions of a labor representative but create a rebuttable presumption of such
intent. Congress may create factual presumptions in criminal cases. See, e.g., INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 4704(a) (possession of narcotics in package without revenue stamp prima
facie evidence of illegal purchase, sale or distribution), upheld against constitutional at-
tack in Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928) (former § 4704, Revenue Act of
1914, § 1, 38 STAT. 785, as amended, 40 STAT. 1130 (1919)). But factual presumptions
are unconstitutional unless a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact to
be presumed exists. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943). A presumption
of intent to influence the official activities of a labor official probably could be constitu-
tionally presumed from the fact of payment.
7. See statute quoted note 5 supra. No federal restrictions are currently imposed upon
welfare funds administered unilaterally by the employer, even though 92% of all welfare
and 86% of all pension funds are of this type, FINAL REPORT 14, and some have been
seriously abused, id. at 18-23. The President favors a requirement that all employee bene-
fit plans register with the federal government and that those covering more than 100
employees file annual reports. 41 L.R.R.M. 232 (1958). Legislation so designed is pend-
ing. S. 288, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). Moreover, the requirement of joint adminis-
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reduced bribery and extortion," nor eliminated corrupt or inefficient welfare
funds,9 nor significantly enhanced the opportunity of employee beneficiaries
tration does not apply to employer-supported welfare funds established prior to January
1, 1947. 61 STAT. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(g) (1952).
8. Only six cases involving illegal payments or receipt of money under § 302 have
been reported. See United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299 (1956) (conviction); United
States v. Brennan, 134 F. Supp. 42, 137 F. Supp. 888 (D. Minn. 1955), aff'd, 240 F.2d 253
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957) (same); United States v. Mejias, 131 F.
Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1955) (indictment upheld) ; United 'States v. Waterman Dock Co.,
131 F. Supp. 956 (D.P.R. 1955) (same); United States v. Connelly, 129 F. Supp. 786
(D. Minn. 1955) (same). One prosecution has been unsuccessful. See Ventimiglia v.
United States, 242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957), notes 17-18 infra and accompanying text.
The Senate authorized a special committee to conduct "an investigation . . . of the
extent to which criminal or other improper practices or activities are, or have been, en-
gaged in the field of labor-management relations .... " S. REs. 74, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957), reprinted in Hearings Before the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the
Labor or Management Field, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1957). The Committee
focused its attention on "problems inherent in labor-management collusion . . . violence,
shakedowns and extortions." Id. at 2. The most spectacular disclosures to date concern
misuse or embezzlement of union funds by union officials. See Testimony of Dave Beck,
id. pt. 5, at 1538-77, 1654-84; James Cross, id. pt. 8, at 2905-49; James Hoffa, id. pt. 13, at
5267-73. However, the Committee has also uncovered many transactions which fall with-
in § 302. See id. pt. 8, at 2698-704, 2773 (employers purchased tickets to dinner the pro-
ceeds of which were used to purchase a home for an officer of the international repre-
senting their employees) ; id. pt. 8, at 2857-60, 3011-12 ($40,000 "loan" from employer to
president of union representing his employees) ; id. pt. 6, at 1964-76 (employer bribery of
union organizer to cease enforcing union rule delimiting scope of employee job perform-
ance) ; id. pt. 10, at 3888, 3912 (payments to union leader to end jurisdictional picket-
ing) ; id. pt. 10, at 3912 (to establish "sweetheart" contract). A summary of these prac-
tices is contained in SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMPROPER AcriviTiFs IN THE LABOR
OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, INTERIM REPORT 4 (March 1958). See also BARBASH, THE
PRACTICE OF UNIONISM 306-23 (1956) ; Bell, Scandals in- Union Welfare Funds, Fortune,
April 1954, p. 140.
The Ethical Practices Code of the AFL-CIO, Code I, adopted Aug. 29, 1956, reprinted
in 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. ff 50C02 (1957), condemns current use of "paper locals" to obtain
employer payments to prevent organization of employees into legitimate unions. See
Lacey v. O'Rourke, 147 F. Supp. 922, 924-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (discussion of paper
locals). Trade union officials are further warned not to accept kickbacks, under-the-table
payments or gifts of other than nominal value from any business organization with which
their union bargains collectively. Code IV, adopted Jan. 31, 1957, reprinted in 5 CCH
LAB. L. RP. ff 50002 (1957).
9. As of 1956, welfare programs provided some sort of insurance coverage or retire-
ment pensions to an estimated 75 million persons-29 million workers and 46 million
dependents. FINAL REPORT 11. The greatest growth in numbers and coverage has occurred
since 1945. In 1954, contributions to these funds totaled $6.8 billion, over $4.5 billion of
which was paid by employers. Id. at 12. An estimated $25 billion was held in reserves
to meet future obligations. Id. at 6.
Various factors have induced the growth of welfare and pension plans. Employers
are required by the Taft-Hartley Act to bargain about welfare benefits. W. W. Cross &
Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 877-78 (1st Cir. 1949). Employer contributions to welfare
funds are deductible from gross income either as reasonable and necessary business ex-
penses, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162, or as contributions to qualified pension plans, id.
1958]
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to enforce their rights.10 On the other hand, the section has been interpreted
to prohibit joint action otherwise legitimate and even specifically encouraged
by federal statute.11
§ 404. Employees' benefits are subject to income taxation, if at all, when received, id.
§ 402(a), and the income of a qualified welfare fund is tax exempt, id. § 501(c) (9). See
Note, 70 HAxv. L. REv. 490, 506-08 (1.957).
Welfare and pension plans vary greatly in organization, coverage and methods of
financing. Although 92% of all welfare plans and 86% of all pension plans are adminis-
tered by a single employer without significant union participation, FINAL REPORT 14, joint-
ly administered programs exist in such industries as coal, clothing manufacturing and
trucking.
Serious abuse has been found in both bilaterally and unilaterally administered funds.
Id. at 18. Forms of abuse encountered include embezzlement, kickbacks, exorbitant in-
surance charges, mismanagement, waste, extravagant salaries and expense accounts and
nepotism. Id. at 3.
Despite § 302, the Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and Pensions found "more irreg-
ularities . . . and perhaps . . . a higher incidence of abuse [in joint funds] . . . than in
... employer administered plans." Id. at 18. The most important failing, particularly in
multiemployer funds, is a "diffusion of responsibility" between employer and union trus-
tees. Id. at 24-25; see note 53 infra and accompanying text. In addition, the Committee
discovered "an almost complete absence of any routine accounting to the beneficiaries."
FiNAL REPORT 3.
The acquisition and maintenance of commercial insurance appears to have engendered
particular abuse. Id. at 7. The intense competition and multistate regulation associated
with group insurance has resulted in high commissions and service fees to "influential"
persons performing no services, kickbacks to trustees and frequent "switching" from one
insurance carrier to another in order to obtain the higher first-year commissions. Id. at
25-40.
Moreover, some funded plans have made substantial investments in union property or
in the property or securities of the employer. Such investments may be unsound because
not made at arms length, see, e.g., Laundry Worker's Welfare Fund, id. at 44-45, or be-
cause they result in dilution of the employee's protection against job insecurity, id. at 43.
The Attorney General believes that the primary reason for continuing corruption in
jointly administered welfare funds is § 302's failure to make corrupt practices a crime.
See Testimony of Rex Collings, Jr., Chief, General Crimes Section, Criminal Division,
Dep't of Justice, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Plans of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 903-05
(1955). Nevertheless, the government has brought no suit involving failure to comply
with the organizational requirements of § 302.
10. To facilitate enforcement of the beneficiaries' interest, § 302 requires that em-
ployer payments be made to a trust in accordance with a detailed agreement. 61 STAT.
157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1952), quoted note 5 supra. But state trust law is
often inadequate to handle problems arising under an employee welfare or pension plan.
FINAL REPORT 60-68; Note, Protection of Beneficiaries Under Employee Benefit Plans,
58 CoLUm. L. REv. 78, 92-95 (1958). See also Note, Legal Problems of Private Pension
Plans, 70 HARV. L. Rav. 490 (1957) ; note 50 infra. On the scope of the requisite detailed
agreement, see text at note 52 infra.
11. Employer payments to a jointly administered trust fund providing, inter alia, for
apprenticeship and training are illegal under § 302. Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v.
Sheet Metal Workers, 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct. 367 (1958).
The Secretary of Labor, however, is authorized to promote the welfare of apprentices
and encourage labor standards by bringing together labor and management for the for-
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Since employer payments other than to "representatives of his employees"
are not proscribed; the scope of section 302 depends on the content of the
term "representative." Rejecting an earlier interpretation which so limited
"representative" that only payments to the treasury of the organization or
individual certified as exclusive bargaining agent were condemned, 12 the Su-
preme Court has construed the section to encompass payments to all persons
empowered by employees to deal with their employer.' 3 Thus, the parties
mulation of apprenticeship programs. 50 STAT. 664 (1937), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 50
(1952). In the opinion of the Department of Labor, § 302 has obstructed the development
of apprenticeship programs. Although some such programs currently violate § 302, chal-
lenge is likely only if an individual employee is sufficiently aggrieved to bring suit. Letter
from Edward E. Goshen, Executive Director, Apprenticeship Serv., Dep't of Labor, to the
Yale Law Journal, Jan. 3, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library. The President has recom-
mended that § 302 be amended to permit joint funds for apprenticeship purposes, 5 CCH
LAB. L. REP. 150054 (1957), and a bill has been introduced to this effect. See H.R. 10234,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1958). For other examples of joint action prohibited by § 302,
see notes 35-41 infra and accompanying text.
12. United States v. Ryan, 225 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1955), reV'd, 350 U.S. 299 (1956),
69 HAnv. L. REv. 386 (1955), 54 MicH. L. Rav. 429 (1956). The act defines "represen-
tative" as "including any individual or labor organization." 61 STAT. 162 (1947), adopting
definition of Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152(4) (1952). The Second
Circuit determined that throughout the Taft-Hartley Act the term consistently means an
agent selected as the exclusive representative by a majority of the employees in a bargain-
ing unit. United States v. Ryan, supra at 421. The NLRB has permitted employees to
choose an individual as their exclusive bargaining agent. Louisville 'Sanitary Wiper Co.,
65 N.L.R.B. 88 (1945). Hence, the Ryan court concluded that § 302 prohibits payments
to an individual only when he, rather than a union, is exclusive bargaining representative.
Relying on legislative history, the court also concluded that Congress was concerned only
with welfare funds and not bribery. United States v. Ryan, supra at 424. But see note
4 supra and accompanying text.
The dissent argued that since the definition of "labor organization," 61 STAT. 162
(1947), adopting definition of Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1952),
comprehends an individual, the definition of "representative is redundant unless there are
some individuals who are representatives but not exclusive bargaining representatives.!
United States v. Ryan, supra at 424-25. Furthermore, the dissent points out that at least
two e-xceptions to §§ 302(a), (b), presuppose that employer payments to a union official,
as distinguished from the union treasury, are proscribed. See 61 STAT. 157 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 186(c) (1) (1952) (employer payments of wages earned by a representative) ;
61 STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (3) (1952) (sale or purchase of an article at the
prevailing market price), quoted note 5 supra. Similar reasoning in the district court had
led to Ryan's conviction. See United States v. Ryan, 128 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ;
accord, United States v. Brennan, 134 F. Supp. 42 (D. Minm 1955), aff'd, 240 F.2d 253
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957).
13. Ryan v. United States, 350 U.S. 299 (1956), reversing 225 F.2d 417 (2d Cir.
1955). The Court did not undertake to decide "if any official of a union is ex officio a
representative of employees," id. at 301, but held that Ryan, as union president and prin-
cipal negotiator, fell within this category. The Court approved the view of the dissent
below, see note 12 supra, and further found that a narrow reading of the term represen-
tative would frustrate the primary intent of Congress, for unless union officers were rep-
resentatives, employer welfare payments made directly to a union official would not fall
within § 302, Ryan v. United States, supra at 305.
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most susceptible to employer bribes and most likely to attempt extortion,
such as members of negotiating committees and business agents, are clearly
representatives for the purposes of section 302.14 Union functionaries who
do not deal directly with the employer but whose attitudes and actions have
substantial effect on employee rights, however, may be beyond the section
and its prohibitions.15 Moreover, section 302 does not prohibit employer pay-
ments to labor unions or union officers who do not represent his employees.",
Such payments might be made to induce a union to refrain from organizing
employees or to reorganize them in a more "co-operative" union.17 While
bribes interfering with employees' rights of self-organization constitute an un-
fair labor practice,' 8 the only available federal sanction is an NLRB cease
14. The other reported cases of prosecutions under § 302 also involved union officials
who dealt directly with employers. See cases cited note 8 supra. United States v. Bren-
nan, 134 F. Supp. 42, 137 F. Supp. 888 (D. Minn. 1955), aff'd, 240 F.2d 253 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957) (conviction); United States v. Waterman Dock Co.,
131 F. Supp. 956 (D.P.R. 1955) (indictment upheld), are the only cases in which an
employer was also prosecuted.
15. Under the Supreme Court's definition of a representative as one "authorized by
the employees to act for them in dealings with their employers," United States v. Ryan,
350 U.S. 299, 302 (1956), employer payments to an official of an international union or a
joint council who did not negotiate with the employer would apparently fall outside the
sanctions of § 302. Yet such officials often have broad authority under the union con-
stitution to control the bargaining process and frequently scrutinize the final agreement
entered into by the local union. PETERsoN, AMFmRcAN LABOR UNiows 59 (1945). See
Constitution of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, summarized in United States v.
Brennan, 240 F.2d 253, 257-59 (8th Cir. 1957). Within the unit which negotiates with
the employer there may be other functionaries such as economic analysts, public relations
experts or the treasurer who have important roles in determining union policy but who
do not deal with employers. For a discussion of functional and constitutional tests of who
is a union officer, see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 771 (1957). Moreover, an employer may want
to buy the loyalty of any person connected with a union who has confidential information,
including a secretary or clerk.
16. Ventimiglia v. United States, 242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957).
17. In Ventimiglia v. United States, supra note 16, a corporate roofing contractor
and two of its officers were indicted for conspiracy to violate § 302(a) by making pay-
ments to a labor organizer in order to permit their unorganized employees to work on a
union construction job. Their conviction was reversed on the ground that the defendants
had not conspired to commit a criminal act since the labor official did not represent their
employees. He was, in fact, being paid not to organize them. United States v. Ventimiglia,
145 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Md. 1956). The transaction in Brennan v. United States, 240
F.2d 253 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957), was within § 302 although made
to effectuate a change of union representation, because the union officers receiving the
payment already represented some of the employer's employees in another bargaining unit.
All state statutes proscribing bribery of union officials prohibit payments to any labor
representative, regardless of whether he represents the payor's employees. See, e.g.,
People v. Chester, 4 Misc. 2d 949, 158 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1956)
(payment to effect change of bargaining representative). See also note 4 supra.
18. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (2) (1952) ; NLRB
v. Hollywood-Maxwell Co., 126 F.2d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1942) (payment to union or-
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and desist order.19 Because the fact of representation need not measure the
extent of prejudice to employee interests, section 302's criminal sanctions
should apply to prejudicial employer payments whether or not the person paid
was empowered by the employees to deal with management.
20
Although designed to regulate employer payments to union welfare funds,
section 302 may not even reach such contributions.21 Payments will not be
proscribed, nor the exception embodying the regulatory scheme have any
effect, if union officials acting as trustees of a fund are considered independent
ganizer to induce petition for representation election at a time union likely to lose) ; E. A.
Laboratories, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 625, 645 (1948) (union organizer offered lucrative job to
abandon union activities); Armory Garment Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 182 (1948) (payment to
induce union officer not to testify). Employer payments to an employee to influence his
vote at a representation election are also an unfair labor practice. J. E. Cote, 101 N.L.R.B.
1486, 1503-06 (1952). Because the employee need not b a representative, the scope of
§ 8(a) (1) is greater than § 302. Legislation has been introduced, however, which would
make employer payments to an employee to enable him to influence any other employee
in the exercise of his rights of self-organization a violation of § 302. H.R. 10248, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(a) (2) (1958); S. 3099, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(a) (2) (1958),
reprinted in 41 L.R.R.M. 248 (1958). Payments to influence only the recipient employee
apparently would not be within the scope of this amendment.
19. See 49 STAT. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952). Although the
Board may void contracts, J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321. U.S. 332 (1944), or require an
employer to refund dues paid to an employer-favored union, NLRB v. Braswell Motor
Freight Lines, 209 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1954), it has no authority to impose a punitive
rather than a remedial sanction, Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36
(1938) ; NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257 (1939). Thus, it cannot
effectively penalize employer payments interfering with an employee's rights to self-or-
ganization until after a cease and desist order has been issued.
20. Upon the recommendation of the President, Congress is currently considering
amending § 302 to prohibit payments to "any person who is a representative of any em-
ployees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce in his capacity as such rep-
resentative." H.R. 10248, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(a) (a) (1) (1958); S. 3099, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(a) (a) (1) (1958), reprinted in 41 L..R.M. 248 (1958). By re-
quiring the prosecution to prove that the payment was made to a representative "in his
capacity as a representative," this amendment avoids most of the objections to the inaluin
prohibitum nature of § 302. See note 6 supra. For where a payment is not made to in-
fluence a labor leader's official acts, it will most likely be made to the representative in
a capacity other than as a representative or be de mininris. The criminal proscription
should also run against indirect payments prejudicing employee interests, and against all
parties to the payments. Cf. Acts of N.Y. Legislature, abstracted in N.Y. Times, March
29, 1958, p. 9, cols. 2-3 (misdemeanor to offer or accept bribe to induce a work stoppage
and for labor or management consultant to accept a bribe).
21. Section 302(c) (5) (A), quoted note 5 supra, permits employer contributions to
a trust fund "established by [his employees'] representative." Section 302(g) provides
that compliance with the requirement of joint administration shall not be applicable to
contributions to "trust funds established by collective agreement" prior to January 1, 1946.
Thus, Congress apparently meant to exempt contributions to a trust fund established
either by "such representative" or by "collective agreement." Note, Legal Problems of
Private Pension Plans, 70 HARv. L. REv. 490, 503 (1957). For a criticism of these re-
quirements, see note 22 infra.
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fiduciaries rather than representatives. 22 This construction, adopted by the
Third Circuit,23 conforms to traditional trust doctrine and,24 as long as the
trust is jointly administered, does not frustrate congressional intent to pro-
scribe payments to funds over which a union has unfettered control.25 But it
22. Since § 302 only prohibits employer payments to "representatives of his em-
ployees," employer subsidization of welfare funds administered without union participation
is not subject to § 302 strictures.
Unintended results may flow from consistent use of the term "representative" in the
statute. See Note, Legal Problems of Private Pension Plans, 70 HARv. L. REv. 490,
503 (1957). After United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299 (1956), representative can mean
either an individual union official who deals with employers, or the exclusive bargaining
agent. See text at note 13 supra. Section 302(a) prohibits employer payments to a "rep-
resentative of his employees," while § 302(c)(5) only exempts payments to a welfare
trust "established by such representative." Thus, if representative means "exclusive bar-
gaining agent," employer payments to a union officer who jointly administered a trust
fund would not be governed by § 302. Similarly, if representative means a union official
who deals with employers, employer payments to a welfare trust will be legal only where
the fund was established by the individual union officer. But since the Supreme Court
recognized that § 302 used representative in both senses, United States v. Ryan, supra
at 303, consistent interpretation appears as unnecessary as it is unfortunate. One com-
mentator has suggested that all welfare fund trustees, even those appointed solely by the
employer, may automatically be representatives since they must of necessity deal with
the employer on behalf of employees. Note, Legal Problems of Private Pension Plans,
70 HAtv. L. REv. 490, 504 (1957). On this view, payments to employer-established and
administered trust funds would be illegal since the funds were not established by such
representatives. Ibid. However, such an interpretation ignores the requirement in United
States v. Ryan, supra at 302, that the representative be authorized by the employees.
Nevertheless, under the present requirement that a legal fund be "established by such
representative," employer-established welfare funds could not be converted into jointly
administered welfare trusts unless reconstituted in collective bargaining. Moreover, an
employer anxious to include some union representation among the trustees of a self-
established fund could not do so unless he were willing to give the union joint control.
Consequently, the requirement that the fund be "established by such representative" should
be eliminated, and, assuming joint administration is not abandoned altogether, see text
at note 57 infra, employer payments to a representative should be permitted if made to
a welfare trust in which not more than half the trustees are employee representatives.
23. See United Marine Div., ILA, AFL v. Essex Transp. ,Co., 216 F.2d 410 (3d Cir.
1954) ; accord, Rice Stix Dry Goods Co. v. St. Louis Labor Health Inst., 15 CCH Lab.
Cas. ff 64727 (E.D. Mo. 1948) (employer payments to an independent Health Institute
were not to a "representative of his employees" even though principal officers of union were
also directors'of the Institute) ; Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers,
145 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Cal. 1956), rev'd, 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
78 Sup. Ct. 367 (1958), discussed note 28 infra. Contra, Conditioned Air & Refrigera-
tion Co. v. Plumbing & Pipefitting Labor-Management Relations Trust, 32 CCH Lab.
Cas. -70546 (S.D. Cal. 1956), off'd per curianz, No. 15445, 9th Cir., Feb. 3, 1958.
24. See 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS § 1 (rev. ed. 1951) ; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 8 (2d ed. 1956)
(agent acts on instruction of his principal but trustee is not subject to beneficiary's con-
trol).
25. In United Marine Div., ILA, AFL v. Essex Transp. Co., 216 F.2d 410 (3d Cir.
1954), an employer allegedly made an oral promise to make payments to a jointly ad-
ministered welfare fund. Because § 302 permits employer payments to a welfare fund
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provides no conceptual basis for securing the requisite joint supervision since
the trustees of a welfare fund administered solely by the union would also be
independent fiduciaries and thus not subject to section 302 controls. 2 6 Further-
more, by excepting contributions to jointly administered welfare trusts from
the general prohibition, Congress clearly implied that the labor officials acting
as trustees are representatives. Under any other interpretation, the exception
and the limitations it imposes upon purpose, accountability and organization
would be meaningless. 27
On the other hand, if employer payments to jointly administered trusts are
not insulated because the union trustees are representatives, section 302 pre-
cludes desirable forms of union-management co-operation. 28 To qualify under
the exception, a joint fund can only provide employees with medical care,
only if "the detailed basis on which ... payments are to be made" is in writing, the com-
pany argued that enforcement of the oral agreement would be illegal. Instead of dealing
with the oral nature of the agreement, the court held that none of the strictures of § 302
were applicable since payments to welfare fund trustees were not payments to a repre-
sentative. "It is true that they were chosen half and half by the employers' association
and this union. But we think that when set up as a board ... these individuals are not
acting as representatives of either union or employers. They are trustees of a fund and
have fiduciary duties in connection therewith as do any other trustees." Id. at 412. Since
the employer's promise concerned a fund previously established in writing by the union
and an employers' association of which he was not a member, the court might have
validated the payments within the bounds of § 302 (c) (5).
26. Although requiring use of the trust form, § 302's provision on joint administration
implicitly recognizes the possibility of a conflict of interest when any labor official serves
as trustee of a fund which provides benefits to the workers he represents. A union trus-
tee may use his office to discriminate against beneficiaries who do not support the union
leadership, fail to enforce employer contributions to the fund where the employer has
made some other concession, or attempt to maximize benefits by imprudent investment,
thus subjecting the employer to demands for increased contributions. Although any con-
flict of interest is condemned by traditional trust doctrine, 3 BOGERT, TRuSTS § 543 (rev.
ed. 1946), allowing unions to exercise some control over the administration of the fund
appears reasonable. Absent union participation, welfare funds, unlike most trusts, would
be administered by a party-the employer-whose interests are at least partly antagonis-
tic to those of the beneficiaries. Moreover, utilizing the union as trustee often involves
substantial administrative economies. For examples of efficient joint administration, see
FINAL REroRa 115, 120, 177, 187.
27. See statute quoted note 5 supra.
28. Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers, 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct. 367 (1958), held that § 302 proscribes employer payments
to a Joint Industry Board which met the organizational requirements of § 302 but was
formed for purposes other than health and welfare. The principal objects of the Joint
Board were to arbitrate disputes arising out of the collective agreement, to recruit and
train apprentices, to provide a forum for joint consultation and to co-operate with public
and quasi-public bodies on public relations and legislation affecting the industry.
Because the employer's contributions were to a fund established by an employers' asso-
ciation to which he did not belong and a local which did not represent his employees,
the court's finding that the Joint Board was a representative of his employees, as required
by § 302(a), is questionable. See 43 VA. L. REv. 1317 (1957). Moreover, the act's
objectives which led the Supreme Court to construe "representative" broadly, United
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compensation for injuries, unemployment benefits, pensions or life insurance.20
Thus, payments to joint funds which secure vacation or severance pay, for
example, are prohibited.30 While such payments may be made directly to
employees with impunity, 31 a joint fund may be necessary to insure receipt
of promised benefits in industries where work is sporadic and employers un-
stable.32 Furthermore, section 302 prohibits management from financing joint
programs for the administration and enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements. 33 Although alternative methods are available, the parties should
be able to perfect combined measures without facing criminal sanctions. In
addition, many problems common to labor and management, such as auto-
States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299 (1956), were not applicable since no possibility of improper
use of the funds existed unless the employer trustees concurred.
Congress may not have been aware that § 302's blanket prohibition and limited excep-
tions would preclude innocent employer payments. Senator Pepper, who opposed the bill,
pointed out to Senator Taft that § 302 would prevent employer payments to union-ad-
ministered recreation funds. Senator Taft thought such payments were already prohibited
by the Wagner Act. This view is probably incorrect. See NLRB v. Algoma Plywood &
Veneer Co., 121 F.2d 602, 610 (7th Cir. 1941.) (furnishing refreshments at employee as-
sociation picnic does not violate Wagner Act) ; Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
221 F.2d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1955) (extending financial support to a union recreation
committee constitutes "laudable cooperation" and not an unfair labor practice under pro-
visions of the Taft-Hartley Act identical to those of Wagner Act). And Senator Taft's
further statements only indicate that § 302 was intended to prevent employer payments
which union leaders might use at their complete discretion. Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 1,
at 51-53. The floor debate was equally superficial. See 93 CONG. REc. 4748 (1947).
29. 61 STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1952), quoted note 5 supra.
30. Employer payments to a jointly administered trust fund to secure pooled vacation
benefits are permitted under § 302(g) only if the fund was established prior to January
1, 1947. 61 STAT. 158 (1947), 29 U.,S.C. § 186(g) (1952). This exception was inserted
at the request of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union to preserve a long-
standing vacation fund. Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 1341-44 (Testimony of David
Dubinsky).
31. Under the Taft-Hartley Act, employers are required to bargain over fringe
benefits. W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949) (group insurance
program); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948) (pension plan);
Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131, 136 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941)
(vacation plans).
32. In the garment trades, painting, fishing and bricklaying, for instance, the work is
seasonal, many of the employers marginal and the labor turnover high. To insure that
vacation, sickness, severance and other fringe benefits are available when promised, pre-
payment, usually a percentage of payroll, into a special fund may be necessary. And the
union, as the most stable organization in the industry, could make significant contribu-
tions to such a fund's supervision. Moreover, where labor turnover is high, an employee
may not remain in any one job long enough to accumulate vacation or other benefits.
Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 1341-44 (Testimony of David Dubinsky). Currently,
pooled fringe benefits are primarily confined to the clothing industry. See BRAUN, UNION
MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 199, 251-55 (1947).
33. See, e.g., the functions of the Joint Industry Board condemned in Sheet Metal
Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers, 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denicd,
78 Sup. Ct. 367 (1958), discussed note 28 supra.
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mation 34 and productivity,35 industry-wide advertising and lobbying, 6 ap-
34. Concern over unemployment and worker dislocation caused by technological ad-
vances has resulted in a variety of labor-management plans to moderate the pace of
change and its impact upon displaced workers. Some of these plans employ jointly ad-
ministered trusts which are permitted under § 302 in so far as their purpose can be
denominated "unemployment benefits" or "pensions on retirement." Whether a fund estab-
lished to provide long-term benefits or employment to the technologically displaced meets
these purposes has never been litigated, but in the opinion of an Attorney General at least
one such trust, the Musician's Royalty Fund, is legal. Letter from Tom Clark, Att'y
Gen., to Maurice Tobin, Secretary of Labor, Dec. 13, 1948, reprinted in S. REP. 986,
80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 107 (1948).
The Musician's Royalty Fund, established in 1943 and revised in 1947 to avoid offend-
ing § 302, employs musicians to perform at charity performances. The fund is supported
by payments from record manufacturers, based upon the number of records sold. An
independent trustee, appointed by the recording companies, receives the money and allots
it to the union locals on the basis of membership. The trustee is to ratify the type, time
and place of the performance recommended by the local union. The locals, which pick
the musicians actually performing, must certify that services have been completed before
any wages are paid by the trustee. Whether the musician is paid directly by the trustee
or the local distributes its allotment is unclear. S. REP. 986, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4,
at 50-52 (1948) ; id. pt. 3, at 108. The musicians' union apparently feared that without an
independent trustee the plan would not meet the requirements of § 302, since (1) most
of the musicians employed had never worked for the recording companies and the fund
might thus not have been for the "exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer,"
and (2) the payments made to musicians might not have been "unenployment benefits"
within the permissible purposes of § 302(c) (5). Although the trustee's independence is
dubious in view of his limited discretion, the Attorney General relied upon a provision
in the agreement making it a breach of trust for the trustee to act so as to become a
"representative of employees." No other instances of funds evading the requirements of
§ 302 by the use of an "independent trustee" have been found. But if the Attorney
General was correct, a union may retain considerable discretion in administering employer-
contributed funds otherwise prohibited by § 302 merely by interposing a third-party trus-
tee to accept initial payments.
The guaranteed annual wage is also an attempt to solve the problems of dislocation
and sporadic employment. Solomon, The Guaranteed Annual Wage and Other Types of
Job Security Plans-An Explanation and Analysis, 7 WEsRN RES. L. REv. 117 (1956).
Jointly administered trusts are utilized in administering some guaranteed wage plans, id.
at 125, 126, and are presumably for a permissible purpose under § 302 as "unemployment
benefits."
However, other efforts to deal with technological change, such as education and train-
ing of unskilled workers, would be illegal to the extent dependent upon employer pay-
ments and joint administration. Cf. BARBASH, THE PRACnICE OF UNIONISM 269-74 (1956)
(union educational programs) ; PRENTIcE-HALL, SUCCESSFUL EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
281-322 (1952).
35. Profit-sharing is increasingly an important subject of collective bargaining. BAR-
B3ASH, op. cit. supra note 34, at 153-55; see, e.g., proposal of UAW to divide "excess
profits" among workers, stockholders and consumers, 41 L.R.R.M. 216 (1958). Although
such funds must be established in trust form to secure substantial tax advantages, INT.
REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 401(a), 501(a), employee participation in the administration of
such trusts would violate § 302, see 61 STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 1 86(c) (1) (1952),
quoted note 5 supra (compensation for services exception applicable only if payments com-
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prenticeship programs, 3 7 recreational facilities 38 and low-cost housing,39 are
peculiarly adaptable to co-operative efforts.40 To the extent they depend upon
employer financing, such programs, serving purposes not recognized by the
statute, are illegal when union-appointed trustees are considered union repre-
sentatives.
Since restriction of employer-subsidized joint action thwarts flexibility in
union-management co-operation, only those payments intrinsically undesirable
should be condemned. Thus, section 302 should prohibit all employer pay-
ments made to sway influential labor officials whether or not they represent
any employees in the sense of negotiating with employers. 41 Similarly, lia-
bility should attend payments made in response to extortion demands. 4 2 Be-
pensate representative for his own services) ; cf. PRENTICE-HALL, op. cit. supra note 34,
at 163.
Some industries have continued joint consultation on increased production and reduced
costs originally sponsored by the War Labor Board. DE ScHwEINITz, LABOR AND MAN-
AGEMFENT IN A CormmON ENTERPRISE 1, 37 (1949). See also BRAUN, op. Cit. supra note
32, at 170-72. These committees are invariably employer-financed, DE SCHWRINITZ, Op.
cit. supra at 98, and have often increased their scope to include safety, canteen service,
rest facilities, absenteeism, payments for suggestions and working conditions, id. at 43-44.
See also Dymond, Union Management Cooperation at the Toronto Factory of Lever
Brothers Limited, 13 CAN. J. EcoN. & POL. Sci. 26 (1947) ; Davenport, Enterprise for
Everyinan, Fortune, Jan. 1950, p. 55.
36. See the purposes of the Joint Industry Board, declared illegal in Sheet Metal Con-
tractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers, 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denicd, 78
Sup. Ct. 367 (1953), discussed note 28 supra. Co-operative marketing and public relations
programs are carried on in the men's clothing industry through the Joint Recovery
Board, an industry-wide organization set u~p under the National Industrial Recovery Act
and voluntarily continued after the act was declared unconstitutional in A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). BRAUN, op. cit. supra note 32, at
109; NAT'L COAT & SUIT INDUSTRIAL REcOvERY BD. ANN. REP. 28 (1956).
37. Apprenticeship and training programs are common areas of labor-management
co-operation, particularly in the construction trades. BARBASH, Op. cit. supra note 34, at
172-73. Although co-operation in this area is favored by statute, employer payments to
a "representative" for such purposes are prohibited by § 302. See note 11 supra.
38. For various types of industrial recreational activities and facilities, see PRENTICE-
HALL, op. cit. supra note 34, at 342-55. Employer contributions to union-administered
recreation funds have been held "laudable cooperation" and not an unfair labor practice.
Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1955) (Q 302 not dis-
cussed).
39. The UAW has made joint administration of the existing welfare fund a demand
in its current bargaining negotiations so that some amount will be invested in such com-
munity improvements as health and housing facilities for workers. 41 L.R.R.M. 218 (1958).
See also PREnTICE-HALL, op. cit. supra note 34, at 369-81; BARBASH, op. cit. supra note
34, at 81.
40. Other possible areas for profitable use of jointly administered funds are employee
readjustments incident to plant relocation, charitable fund-raising, employee credit unions
and impartial collection of economic data as background for collective bargaining.
41. See text at notes 16-20 supra.
42. Extortion is currently proscribed by the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (1952) ; see note 4 supra. Additional proscription in a revised § 302 would afford
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yond bribery and extortion, however, only employer payments to joint funds
designed to defray union operating expenses should be criminally proscribed.
Collective bargaining cannot be free of employer-dominated labor organiza-
tions unless unions are financially independent of employers.4 3 In other con-
texts, section 302 protection against misuse of employer payments to union
functionaries need not exceed the establishment of procedural safeguards.44
Joint union-management programs which do not provide employees with
direct benefits require only minimal controls. Since the parties to- the joint
enterprise, rather than employees, are the prime beneficiaries, self-interest
should provide the requisite level of honesty and efficiency. Even were the
fund mismanaged, immediate employee expectations would not be defeated.
Accordingly, where employer funds are transferred to such a program which
is in part administered by labor- representatives or persons chosen by em-
ployees or their representatives, a revised section 302 should merely compel
equal employer participation in the fund's administration 45 and complete dis-
closure to the federal government of all employer payments and the fund's
receipts and disbursements. 46
the government desirable flexibility in prosecuting defendants. For the penalties of the
Hobbs Act may appear too severe in cases which nevertheless deserve some measure of
punishment. Cf. Note, 67 YALE L.J. 325 (1957) (discussing this problem in connection
with robbery).
43. See 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1952).
44. In so far as substantive law proscribes various activities, they will not be vali-
dated by permitting employer payments to joint funds in which employee representatives
participate. A joint attempt to interfere with workers' rights of self-organization, for
instance, would be an unfair labor practice. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a) (1), (b) (1) (1952). And a labor-management conspiracy to restrain trade may
constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. 26 STAT. 290 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1952) ; Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S.
797 (1945) (union-management conspiracy to fix prices violates Sherman Act notvith-
standing a labor organization's general immunity from the antitrust laws). But an in-
dustry-wide advertising program to which the collective agreement requires employers to
contribute is not a restraint of trade. Minkoff v. Jaunty Junior, 36 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup.
Ct. 1942). Nor is a joint committee of a union and an employer association formed to
police and administer the collective agreement in an effort to prevent "destructive com-
petition." Bay Area Painters Joint Comm. v. Orack, 102 Cal. App. 2d 81, 226 P.2d 644
(1951).
45. Equal employer participation should be required to preclude unfettered union con-
trol of funds originating in the employer. See note 3 supra. Without employer partici-
pation, the union could demand payment of funds and then use the money to finance a
strike, organize more employees or lobby for measures repugnant to the employer.
46. Disclosure to the federal government would further insure that the funds were
not being used for purposes adverse to employer interests or for schemes prohibited by
substantive law. See note 44 supra. Moreover, information on the scope and extent of
these plans would be useful both to labor and management and for future legislation.
The Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service have all been
considered satisfactory agencies to administer a welfare fund disclosure statute. FNAL
RFoRT 74-75. Although the Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Plans had
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Joint programs conveying direct employee benefits should be subjected to
more extensive regulation. 47 Currently, the statute requires that employer
payments to welfare funds be made according to a detailed basis specified in
writing-most likely in the collective bargaining agreement 4S--and be held
in trust upon receipt. In addition, the funds must be jointly administered and
an annual audit made available for inspection by interested persons.4 0  The
trust requirement presumably provides a control mechanism by subjecting
the welfare funds to applicable state law." Section 302 does not, however,
no strong preference, it tended to favor the SEC. But the disclosure statute endorsed
by the administration and leading Senators of both parties has chosen the Department
of Labor. S. 2888, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). While the SEC has broad experience
in administering a disclosure statute, it has been limited to the field of corporate security
issuance. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare would seem better qualified
than the Department of Labor to administer a program designed to protect the beneficiaries
of a welfare fund because of its experience with closely related health, old-age pension
and other security programs. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Welfare and
Pension Fuinds of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, at 914-39 (1955) (Testimony of representatives of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare). Considerations of efficiency would suggest that it also serve
as the relevant agency for funds which do not provide direct benefits to employees.
47. Programs providing employees prospective cash benefits such as welfare, pension,
unemployment, vacation and severance payments clearly convey direct benefits. Border-
line benefits such as education and housing should probably be considered direct and
subject to the stringent controls delineated in text. Indirect benefits would then describe
programs promoting the industry and administering the collective agreement. See, e.g.,
Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers, 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct. 367 (1958), discussed note 28 supra.
48. If the collective bargaining agreement only provides that a welfare trust shall
be established, the separate agreement embodying its terms would probably be considered
part of the collective agreement.
49. These controls are all provided in § 302(c) (5). 61 STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c) (5) (1952), quoted note 5 supra.
50. Remarks of Senator Taft, 93 CONG. REc. 4753 (1947), quoted note 3 supra.
State trust law has proved "wholly inadequate" to safeguard the beneficiaries' interest
in welfare and pension trusts. FINAL REPORT 63-68. See also Note, Legal Problems of
Private Pension Plans, 70 HARv. L. REv. 490 (1957) ; Note, Regulation of Employee
Benefit Plans: Activate the Law of Trusts, 8 STAN. L. REv. 655, 666-67 (1956) ; Annot.,
42 A.L.R.2d 461 (1955). Although a beneficiary with merely a contingent interest may
sue to redress a breach of trust, 2 ScoTt, TRUSTS § 200 (2d ed. 1956), only one suit has
been commenced in which beneficiaries have, as a class, sought equitable relief or restitu-
tion of misappropriated funds, see Booth v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp.
755 (D.N.J. 1957) (defendant's motion for summary judgment denied). Booth involves
mismanagement of the Laundry Worker's Welfare Fund. See FINAL REPORT 25. More-
over, the criteria of prudence developed for private trusts may prove inadequate standards
in the field of welfare funds. See Note, Protection of Beneficiaries Under Employee
Benefit Plans, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 78, 92 (1958). A few suits have been brought by in-
dividual beneficiaries to enforce already accrued interests. See Bednar v. UMW Welfare
& Retirement Fund, 25 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 68352 (D.D.C. 1953) (employee who did not
work two days before a strike found to be employed at end of strike so as to be entitled
to pension) ; Geron v. Kennedy, 381 Pa. 97, 112 A.2d 181 (1955) (employee working 17
years in anthracite and 8 years in bituminous coal mines not entitled to "anthracite"
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guarantee that sufficient information will be available to enable an individual
employee to determine if his interests are being prejudiced by improper trus-
tee conduct. The required written agreement need only delineate the method
of employer payments.r' Since distributions to employees apparently lie in the
trustee's discretion, an individual employee may be unable to identify his
rights. Again, the statute fails to specify the extent of the annual audit; that
report, too, may be a summary memorandum of little value to the average
employee. 2 Introducing the employer as a supervisor by requiring joint ad-
ministration has also, in most instances, provided only illusory protection.
The employer's interest in welfare fund management has proved tenuous once
his contributions become irrevocable. 53
pension for 20 years service although UMW represented employees in both industries);
Forrish v. Kennedy, 377 Pa. 370, 105 A.2d 67 (1954) (employee entitled to pension even
though he had violated union constitution by selling liquor) ; Hobbs v. Lewis, 197 Tenn. 44,
270 S.W.2d 352 (1954) (employee could not secure claimed pension by attaching em-
ployer funds set aside for out-of-state welfare fund since court lacked jurisdiction over
trust with foreign headquarters).
Whether an employee welfare trust is private or charitable is not clear. Van Horn
v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1949) (charitable); United Garment Workers v.
Jacob Reed's Sons, 83 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1949) ("rather sacred"); Upholsterer's
Int'l Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co., 82 F. Supp. 570, 575 (E.D. Pa. 1949) (court
can enjoin "improper" expenditures, lush salaries, excessive restrictions or attempts to
restrict beneficiaries' rights). Yet individual beneficiaries have been able to enforce their
rights without joining the Attorney General or bringing a class action, see cases cited
supra, thus implying that the trust is private. On the number and definiteness of persons
necessary to constitute a charitable trust, see 2-1 BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 362, 367, at p. 51
(rev. ed. 1953), and cases cited. On the role of the Attorney General, see Bogert, Proposed
Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52 MICH. L. REv. 633 (1954) ; Clark,
Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE
L.J. 997, 1007 & n.101 (1957).
State trust law will be completely ineffective if § 302(e), giving jurisdiction to the
federal courts to restrain violations of § 302, is held to pre-empt state trust law with
respect to jointly administered funds. See In re Bricklayers Welfare Fund, 41 L.R.R.M.
2334 (Pa. C.P. 1957) (only federal courts have jurisdiction over alleged violations of
§ 302). But cf. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 2 N.Y.2d 913, 914, 141 N.E.2d 825, 826 (1957) (§ 302
does not pre-empt New York bribery statute).
51. 61 STAT. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1952), quoted note 5 mpra.
Section 302(c) (5) was apparently intended to require specification of employee beneficial
interest, see remarks of Senator Taft, 93 CONG. RFc. 4753 (1947), quoted note 3 supra,
but the language of the section failed to effect its purpose. But see Van Horn v. Lewis,
79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948). Moreover, the requirement of a detailed written agree-
ment concerning employer payments has not been strictly enforced. See United Marine
Div., ILA, AFL v. Essex Transp. Co., 216 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1954), discussed note 25
supra; William Dunbar Co. v. Painters & Glaziers Dist. Council, 129 F. Supp. 417 (D.
D.C. 1955) (written agreement not required to be signed).
52. FINAL REPORT 59; SUBCOMITrEE ON WELFARE AND PENSION FUNDS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, INTERIML REPORT OF JANUARY, 1955, 32-33.
53. Many employers have "completely abdicated their responsibilities" because of
lack of interest, union coercion or a desire not to upset the collective bargaining process
by calling attention to union mismanagement. FINAL REPORT 24-25. Some employers
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Investment of the welfare fund or selection of an insurance carrier, the
most critical aspects of administration, are the areas in which the greatest
abuse has occurred. 54 Consequently, these functions should be performed by
an independent third-party trustee in all funds granting direct employee
benefits. Although selection of the trustee should initially be left to the parties
to the collective agreement,55 minimum standards of experience and reliability
should be imposed.5" Distribution of the fund and its income, on the other
hand, may be entrusted to joint administration or to the union, if the parties
so choose, so long as the beneficial interest of each class of employees is
stipulated in detail and comprehensive reports of trust income and disburse-
ments are submitted both to the beneficiaries and the federal government. 7
have allowed the union to run the welfare fund in the hone of discrediting the union.
Ibid. See also Note, Protection of Beneficiaries Under Employee Benefit Plans, 58
COLUm. L. REV. 78, 85, 96 (1958) ; Note, 8 STAN. L. REV. 655, 658 (1956).
Unions have generally opposed joint administration, especially since the law does not
give the union any right to participate in employer-administered plans. Hearings, supra
note 46, at 59-65 (panel discussion) ; Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 1042 (Statement of
William Green, President, AFL) ; id. pt. 3, at 1582 (Testimony of Jacob Potofsky, Presi-
dent, Amalgamated Clothing Workers).
54. The complexities of group insurance, see FINAL REPORT 26-28, and large scale
investment require an expertise beyond that possessed by the average union leader or
businessman, ef. FINAL REPORT 7, 17, 28. For abuses in welfare fund administration
occurring in insurance placement, see id. at 29-37 (excessive commissions and adminis-
tration fees, discriminatory pricing and commissions, kickbacks and frequent carrier
switching). The Senate Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management
Field has also revealed improper practices in insurance placement. See SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, INTERIM
REPORT 4 (March 1958). See also note 10 supra. For a discussion of the political and
economic implications of extensive welfare and pension fund investment in corporate
securities, see BERLE, EcoNoaIc POWER AND THE FREE SocIETY 10-20 (Fund for the
Republic, Free Society ser. 1957).
55. H.R. 2132, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), abstracted in FINAL REPORT 78, required
the appointment of a neutral trustee by a federal district court whenever payments were
made to a fund in which a representative of employees was an officer. And § 302 now
provides that a district court shall upon request appoint an umpire to break any deadlock
among the trustees. 61 STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (B) (1952). But no
reason appears to burden the district courts with the selection unless the parties them-
selves are unable to agree.
56. For federal statutes prescribing minimum standards of reliability and competency
for trustees, see federal Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 73 (1952) ;
Trust Indenture Act, 53 STAT. 1157 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj (1952) (institutional trus-
tee).
The responsibilities of the independent trustee would be limited to investment securing
the maximum safe returns or selection of an insurance carrier on the basis of competitive
bidding. He would not decide what benefits should be provided or to whom. Nor would
he enforce the contractual obligations of the employers to make payments to the fund.
Any beneficiary's claim for benefits would be against the general trustees and not the
special investment trustee. Where insurance is used, the processing of claims would be
handled by the carrier and the general trustees.
57. See note 46 supra.
Comprehensive reporting standards have been suggested by the Senate Subcommittee
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NOTES
Such a revision of section 302 would minimize the corruption and inefficiency
which currently plague employer-financed co-operative efforts without at the
same time subverting joint programs conducive to industrial progress.58
on Welfare and Pension Funds. See FINAL REPORT 72-74. A bill embracing these require-
ments has been introduced by members of the Committee from both parties, S. 2888, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), and is endorsed in principle by the President, 41 L.R.R.M. 232
(1958), and the AFL-CIO, 37 L.R.R.M. 80-81 (1955). See also Berle, Berle Foresees
Public Control of Administration of Pension Funds, 8 J. TAXATION 99 (1958) (suggest-
ing that reports detail the actuarial basis of a funded plan).
A distributional scheme interfering with employee rights granted under the Taft-Hart-
ley Act may be a union or employer unfair labor practice. Jandel Furs, 100 N.L.R.B.
1390 (1952) (discrimination against nonunion members in the distribution of welfare
funds accumulated as a percentage of gross payroll violates the act) ; cf. Upholsterer's
Int'l Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co., 82 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1949) (where
contributions were made as a percentage of union member payroll, § 302 does not require
extension of welfare fund benefits to nonunion employees).
Racial or other invidious discrimination would probably violate the union's duty to
represent fairly all members of the bargaining unit. See Syres v. Local 254, Oil Worker's
Int'l Union, CIO, 223 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1956)
(refusing to extend doctrine of Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), from
Railway Labor Act to Taft-Hartley Act). See also Conley v. Gibson, 78 Sup. Ct. 99
(1957) (extending Steele doctrine to require affirmative union action to protect members
of the bargaining unit threatened by employer discrimination-Railway Labor Act).
58. Based as it is on the notion that self-interest will supplant the need for further
regulation, disclosure to the federal government should provide substantial protection to
employees whose rights would otherwise be prejudiced by corrupt or inefficient distribu-
tion. See FINAL REPORT 70-71. Where the expectations of both present and potential
beneficiaries are jeopardized by dishonest administration, the corruption revealed in the
required reports should spur state authorities to action. Cf. United States v. Kahriger,
345 U.S. 22 (1952) (federal tax requiring information potentially useful in state prose-
cution for gambling does not violate Fifth Amendment). And if the disclosure statute
contains a perjury provision and power of investigation, the federal government can pros-
ecute trustees failing to report accurately. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1952). Uniform report-
ing to a single agency, in addition to furnishing information on which to base possible
future legislation, will provide data enabling employees to evaluate the performance of
union-selected trustees. Presumably, if the employees are dissatisfied with the trust's
efficiency, they may reject the union leadership and substitute executives of their own
choosing. Moreover, where disclosure reveals gross mismanagement, illegal discrimina-
tion, see note 57 supra, or distributions contrary to the trust agreement, beneficiaries with
vested or contingent interests will generally have standing, 2 ScoTrv, TRUSTS § 200 (2d ed.
1956), to enjoin further abuse or obtain restitution, id. §§ 199, 205; 4-1 BOGERT, TRUsTs
§ 861 (rev. ed. 1948) ; ef. Booth v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 755 (D.N.J.
1957) (suit to recover funds embezzled from Laundry Worker's Welfare Fund based upon
information obtained by Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds). Further-
more, disclosure to the federal government may provide beneficiaries with presently vested
interests information required to enforce their claims in court.
On the other hand, simple disclosure may prove inadequate to protect employee in-
terests in welfare trusts. Even if beneficiaries are aware of mismanagement or corruption,
no single employee may have an interest sufficiently substantial to justify the expense of
proceedings to force trustee compliance with established fiduciary duties. Note, Protec-
tion of Beneficiaries Under Employee Benefit Plans, 58 CoLum. L. Rav. 78, 94-95 (1958).
See also FINAL REPORT 66. The scarcity of cases, see note 50 supra, suggests that bene-
1958]
752 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ficiaries with vested claims may be unwilling to enforce them for fear of retaliation by
union officials as well as of prolonged and expensive litigation. See Wilkens v. De Kon-
ing, 152 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (enjoining union attempt to discipline employee
for showing welfare fund report to lawyer). Accordingly, if experience proves disclosure
deficient, it may be necessary to empower the federal government to sue on behalf of
rejected claimants possessing apparently valid demands, to sue for restitution in the name
of all the beneficiaries prejudiced by corrupt distribution and even to prosecute for em-
bezzlement if state authorities appear lax. A federal agency with such enforcement
powers, moreover, might well be able to induce correction of abuses without resort to
court proceedings. Nevertheless, although a significant federal interest in proper ad-
ministration of employee welfare trusts exists, see Berle, Berle Forsees Pulblic Control
of Administration of Pension Funds, 8 J. TAXATION 99 (1958), considerations of sound
labor-management relations suggest that resort to more extensive federal control than
disclosure be avoided in the absence of evidence demonstrating that weapon's deficiency,
cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 463-64 (1957) (dissenting
opinion), quoting Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAav. L.
REv. 999, 1024 (1955).
